Distributed Information Processing
19th Lecture

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Outline

- Information Protection
  - Information Protection in Computer Systems (Cont’d)
- Q&A
Access Control List System

Use of an Access Controller

- Components
  - Addressing descriptor
  - Access control list

- Characteristics
  - Kind of indirect address
  - Possibly replacing protection descriptors with unprotected pointers

- Data Reference
  - Using the pointer to address the access controller
  - Searching the access control list
  - Searching the permission bits
  - Generating a reference request if permitted
Access Controller Model

- **Base**
  - Smith
  - Jones
  - ...

- **Bound**
  - read
  - write
  - read

- **Access Control List**
  - accessing descriptor for this segment

- **Principal Identifiers**

- **Permissions**
Revised Separating Organization
Differences with Capability Systems

- Using the Pointer via the Access Controller
  - Preventing Unauthorized Access

- Using the Access Control List
  - Authorizing Possibly on Every Access

- Updating the Access Control List
  - Making Access Revocation Manageable

- Examining the Access Control List
  - Figuring Out Authorized Users

- Using Different Access Control Lists
  - Differing Based on the Purposes
System with Access Control Lists
Protection Groups

Definition
- Principals Used by More Than One User
  - Members Permitted to Access the Segment

Motivation
- Possibly Very Long List
- Frequently Changing List

Simple Method
- Extending the “Principal Holding” Register
  - One for a personal principal ID
  - Another for each protection group

Protection Group List Must Be Controlled Systematically
Problems & Solutions

Several Memory References

- Shadow Capability Register for Each Pointer Register
  - Loaded with a capability consisting of copies of the addressing descriptor and protection bits
  - Whenever a pointer register is first loaded
  - Not affected by changing an access control list (a minor change in revocability properties)

Clearing Shadow Registers and Triggering Their Reloading
Shadow Capability Registers
Problems & Solutions (Cont’d)

- Allocation and Search of an Access Control List

  - Constraining All Access Control Lists to Contain a Certain Number of Entries
    - E.g., three entries on each access list
      - User
      - Group
      - Universal Group
Authority to Change Access Control Lists

- Self Control
  - Including Permission to Modify the Access Control List
    - Allowing the creator to adjust the list
  - Not Permitting Graceful Changes of Authority
Self Control Scheme

access controller

principal identifiers

base

bound

Smith                read  write  ACL-mod
Jones                read  write
Doe                  read

addressing descriptor for this segment

access control list

permissions
Authority to Change Access Control Lists (Cont’d)

Hierarchical Control

- Including Permission to Modify the Lists of Lower Level Access Controllers
  - Allowing a node to change lists further down the hierarchy
- Permitting Access to Anything in the Entire Subtree
  - Giving too much power to high-level nodes, leading to concentration of authority and possible (unchecked) abuse of higher level authority

Higher Level Checking and Taking Actions Based on the Prescript Field: e.g., Logging the ID and Delaying the Change
Hierarchical Control Scheme
Discretionary and Nondiscretionary Controls

- **Discretionary Control**
  - Creator’s Authorization of Access to What Is Created
    - Against the principle of least privilege

- **Nondiscretionary Control**
  - Authorization Limited by “Employees”
    - Similar to Isolated Compartments and Sensitivity Levels

Confinement: No Sharing with Other Domains
Protecting Objects

Operations On Objects, Working Out Permissions for These Objects

- Type Field Added to a Capability
  - Special instructions requiring different operand capabilities
  - Interpretation of the permission bits different for types
  - Extended “create” operation to permit type specification

Examples of Type Extension in Capability System: Any Data Structure Including Queues, I/O Streams Attached to Terminals, Printers, and the Like

Type Field Placed in the Access Controller
### Typical Protected Objects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Typical Separately Permissible Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data segment</td>
<td>READ data from the segment&lt;br&gt;WRITE data into the segment&lt;br&gt;Use any capability found in the segment&lt;br&gt;Write a capability into the segment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access controller</td>
<td>Read access control list&lt;br&gt;Modify names appearing on an access control list&lt;br&gt;Modify permissions in access control list entries&lt;br&gt;Destroy objects protected by this access controller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFO message queue</td>
<td>Enqueue a message&lt;br&gt;Dequeue a message&lt;br&gt;Examine queue contents without dequeuing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Input/Output</td>
<td>READ data&lt;br&gt;WRITE data&lt;br&gt;Issue device-control commands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remove recording medium (e.g. magnetic tape reel)</td>
<td>READ data&lt;br&gt;WRITE over data&lt;br&gt;WRITE data in new area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Protected Objects and Domains

Protected Subsystems

- Definition
  - Collection of encapsulated program and data segments
    - Preventing other programs from reading/writing them
    - Preventing other programs from disrupting the intended operations
    - Allowing other programs to call the programs by calling the designated entry points

- Motivation
  - Limitations of using objects independently controlled such as reading, writing, or executing as programs
    - Not being able to define a new type dynamically
    - Danger presented by executing a borrowed program
Illustration: A Protected Subsystem

Executing the Borrowed Program Outside the Protected Subsystem Domain
Implementation of Protected Subsystems

- Associating Multiple Domains with a Single Computation (with Asynchronous Activities)
  - Use of a Separate Virtual Processor
    - One with its own domain
    - Another for each protected subsystem

- Using a Single Virtual Processor
  - Association of multiple domains with a single virtual processor

Changing Domains: Changing Principal IDs in ACL Systems, and Changing the Set of Capabilities of the New Domain in Capability Systems; e.g., Including the ENTER Permission Possibly with the Domain ID
Other Considerations

**Domain Switching**
- (Restricted) Role of the Supervisor
  - Having only the Enter capability leading to a authentication program
- Using the Seal Capability (with a Seal in the Type Field)
  - Accessing internal data (Separation of Privilege)
- Distinction between Dynamic and Static Data
  - Using multiple virtual processors
- Passing of Arguments
  - Controlling specially the argument indicating how to return
Other Considerations (Cont’d)

- Precise Model of Protection Goals
  - Isolation vs Sharing

- Verifying the Implementation
  - Establishing the Correctness Formally

- Providing Need-Specification Interface

- Providing System S/W with Constraints
  - Establishing a Set of Protected Functions

- Making Protection Not Affected by Failure

- Constraining After-Release Use

- Communicating Keys to Authorized Users